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1 PP INTRODUCTION 
This Protection Profile (PP) describes the following items: 
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) as a product and its position in production life cycle, 
 The security environment of the TOE includes: the assets to be protected, the threats to 
be encountered by the TOE, the development environment and production utilization 
phases, 
 The security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of integrity 
and confidentiality of User Data and TSF Data,  
 Protection of the TOE and associated documentation during the development and 
production phases, 
 The Information Technology (IT) security requirements which include the TOE 
functional requirements and the TOE assurance requirements. 
1.1 PP Reference 
Title : Common Criteria Protection Profile for Secure Communication Module 
for Water Tracking System 
Sponsor  : Ministry of Health – People Health Agency of Turkey 
Editor(s) : Prepared by Muhammed Ali BİNGÖL, Süleyman KARDAŞ and Ünal 
KOCABAŞ 
CC Version  : 3.1 (Revision 4) 
Publication Date       :12.10.2015 
Assurance Level : The assurance level for this PP is EAL 2.   
General Status : Draft 
Version Number : 1.5 
Key words  :Water Tracking System, Secure Communication Module, Protection 
Profile, PP. 
Note   : A glossary of terms used in the Protection Profile is given in  
   ACRONYMS section of the document (Section 7).  
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1.2 TOE Overview 
1.2.1 Introduction 
The TOE as defined in this Protection Profile is the Secure Communication Module for Water 
Tracking System (WTS). The TOE collects information from input devices such as pH sensor, 
conductivity sensor, temperature sensor, flow meter, RFID / 2D barcode reader, etc., and then 
it sends these collected data to the Data Management Center (DMC).  
In this section, first the overall Water Tracking System is introduced. Then, details of Secure 
Communication Module (TOE) are given. Afterwards the components of TOE, the 
cryptographic operations performed by TOE and the capabilities of TOE are introduced. 
1.2.2 General Overview of Water Tracking System Infrastructure 
Figure 1 depicts the general overview of the Water Tracking System Infrastructure where TOE 
is placed. As seen in the figure, the system is simply composed of two main components. 
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Figure 1 TOE and Its Operational Environment 
 
Secure Communication Module  is a component of the Water Tracking System (WTS).  It is 
responsible for collecting some measurement values of water with different metrics (pH, 
conductivity, temperature, flow speed, RFID / 2D barcode reader). First of all, it collects and 
stores these values in TOE. Then, it transfers the data related to these measurements via 
TCP/IP.  
Data Management Center (DMC) is the remote management center which receives water 
quality measurements, saves quantity of the production, loads configuration parameters, 
updates firmware and controls the SCM. 
Secure communication Module is managed by the operators in DMC. In addition to this, there 
are also some operations, which are performed by using Local Interface of the TOE. 
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The system can perform different processes after receiving the quality/quantity data. But they 
are not in the scope of this Protection Profile.   
1.2.3 TOE Description 
The Secure Communication Module (TOE) of the Water Tracking System may serve various 
functionalities like collecting, communication, security and storage. The TOE collects the data 
of the quality of water in different metrics, such as conductivity of water, pH degree, 
temperature of water used in carboy cleaning, flow speed of water source, and carboy 
identification. It stores measurement related data, and provides the security of this data against 
physical attacks (such as tampering), cryptographic operations and access control functions and 
generates audit data about TOE’s operational processes. 
 Sensing Modules are responsible for measuring water in terms of different metrics and 
transferring the data to the TOE. These functionalities include conductivity of water, 
pH degree, carboy cleaning water temperature, water source flow speed. 
 TOE is responsible for most of the functionalities excluding the Sensing Module 
functions defined above.  It receives data from different number of Sensing Modules, 
formats it into in a suitable form of data and stores the data for a while and then 
transmits the data to the DMC over a secure channel established by TLS (as defined in 
Section 1.2.7.2). TOE also may receive data from an external ID-reader that reads 
RFID tags and 2D barcodes to identify the carboy. TOE outputs data in TCP/IP form. 
TOE is also responsible for generation of audit records of any received and sent data. It 
has data store capability and real time clock. 
The major functional features of the TOE are described below: 
 TOE receives input data from sensing modules and stores measurement related data. 
 TOE provides a Local Interface for reading and configuration operations. 
 TOE provides a Remote Interface for communication and configuration operations. 
 TOE supports firmware update operation via its Remote and Local Interface. 
 The remote interface of TOE sends or receives packets in the form of TCP/IP packet. 
The major security features of the TOE are described below. 
 TOE implements tamper resistant, tamper evident and tamper respondent mechanisms 
(Electro-mechanic Seal). 
 Sub-modules of TOE which store integrity have mesh cover mechanism to detect any 
physical attack. 
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 TOE implements access control mechanisms for both Remote and Local Interfaces. 
 TOE supports TLS connections between DMC and TOE. 
 TOE provides storage integrity. 
 TOE provides self-test functionality for security functions. 
 TOE generates audit data and informs users, when any of the security anomalies 
detailed in Section 6.1.1 are detected.  
1.2.4 TOE Type 
The TOE comprises of hardware and firmware parts that provide collecting, communication, 
storage and security functionalities. 
1.2.5 Logical and Physical Interfaces of TOE 
TOE has two logical interfaces:  
• Remote Interface for DMC or remote maintenance operations 
• Local Interface for local operations 
TOE has the physical interfaces below: 
• Remote Interface port is used to connect to DMC or remote Maintenance Agent. A 
TOE can send or receive data over TCP/IP. 
• Possible TOE Design 
This Protection Profile does not imply a concrete physical architecture. However the expected 
configuration is that external Sensing Modules and external ID-readers are connected to the 
TOE. 
Within this configuration; 
 Sensing Modules are measuring the parameters about water quality and identity.  
 TOE shall provide security and functional requirements listed in Section 1.2.3 and TLS 
related requirements as given in 1.2.7.2.  
1.2.6 TOE Life Cycle 
The life-cycle of the TOE can be separated into the following phases. 
 Development 
 Manufacturing 
 Initialization 
 Operation 
 Maintenance 
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This Protection Profile focuses on Initialization, Operation and Maintenance phases. It has to 
be ensured that previous phases are performed by trusted personnel in secure environments. 
For the maintenance phase, manufacturer shall develop the TOE and maintenance tools so that 
TOE can be repaired properly within the guarantee period which is not in the scope of this 
protection profile. In this protection profile only the access control mechanism for local and 
remote maintenance agent is defined. The TOE manufacturer loads necessary cryptographic 
parameters and terminates the manufacturing phase before TOE is delivered to DMC as 
detailed in 1.2.7.  
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 Figure 2 Sensing Module - TOE - DMC Communication Scenario 
 
1.2.7 Major Cryptographic Functionalities of TOE 
1.2.7.1 Authentication Mechanism for Local Interface 
TOE should provide an access control mechanism for accesses from its Local Interface 
depending on the Role Attribute which is specified within the certificate of the entity. 
Preconditions for local access control are as follows: 
 Local user has a terminal which is compatible with TOE’s Local interface (i.e., Serial 
Bus). 
 Local user has a hardware token which includes local authentication private key and 
public key pair (certificate). The public key is issued by Root Public Key (see Table 3).  
 Local user knows the PIN used to protect the Token. 
Role Attribute: Role Attribute is an attribute field on certificate indicates the  role of accessing 
the Local Interface. There are three types of roles and these are “Initialization Agent”, 
“Maintenance Agent” and “Local Administrator”. 
Initialization Agent Authentication Process is specified as follows: 
 The terminal is connected to TOE (via local interface). 
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 Token is plugged to the terminal.  
 User enters token PIN via terminal. 
 Token verifies the PIN. 
 If verification is successful, Token sends its certificate to TOE via terminal. 
 TOE verifies the Token’s certificate using the Root Public Key.  
 If verification is successful, TOE sends a random number to the Token. 
 Token signs the random number and sends it to TOE. 
 TOE verifies the signature. If the signature is verified then it reads the “Role Attribute” 
on the Token’s certificate. If TOE reads “Initialization Agent” then authentication 
process is completed and Initialization Mode is available. 
Maintenance Agent Authentication Process is specified as follows: 
 The terminal is connected to TOE (via local or remote interface). 
 Token is plugged to the terminal.  
 Agent enters token PIN via terminal. 
 Token verifies the PIN. 
 If verification is successful, Token sends its certificate to TOE via terminal. 
 TOE verifies the Token’s certificate using the Root Public Key.  
 If verification is successful, TOE sends a random number to the Token. 
 Token signs the random number and sends it to TOE. 
 TOE verifies the signature. If the signature is verified then it reads the “Role Attribute” 
on the Token’s certificate. If TOE reads “Maintenance Agent” then authentication 
process is completed and Maintenance Mode is available. 
 If the maintenance agent is connected via remote interface than a TLS connection shall 
be established as defined in 1.2.7.2. Messages exchanged via TLS tunnel.  
Local Administrator Authentication Process is specified as follows: 
 The terminal is connected to the Serial Port. 
 Token is plugged to the terminal.  
 User enters token PIN via terminal. 
 Token verifies the PIN. 
 If verification is successful, Token sends its certificate to TOE via terminal. 
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 TOE verifies the Token’s certificate using the Root Public Key.  
 If verification is successful, TOE sends a random number to the Token. 
 Token signs the random number and sends it to TOE. 
 TOE verifies the signature. If the signature is verified then it reads the “Role Attribute” 
on the Token’s certificate. If TOE reads “Local Administrator” then authentication 
process is completed and Local Administrator access is available. 
1.2.7.2 TLS Mechanism for Remote Interface 
This mechanism provides a secure channel between TOE and DMC or between TOE and 
remote Maintenance Agent.  
 Preconditions in manufacturing phase are as follows: 
 TOE Certificate which includes TLS Authentication Public Key and TOE Private Key, 
shall be loaded in manufacturing phase.  
 Root Public Key which verifies the certificates of DMC shall be loaded in 
manufacturing phase. 
TLS features are specified as follows: 
 Only TLS version 1.2 (or latest upgraded version)shall be supported explained in RFC 
5246 [5] 
 Supported algorithm suite shall be TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES256_CBC_SHA256 
or TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA. 
 Server certificates format shall be X.509. 
 Session Resumption shall not be supported. 
 Session Renegotiation shall not be supported. 
 Both client and server authentication shall be used. 
 Maximum session timeout value shall be 24 hours. TLS session shall be reestablished 
after lifetime is up. 
TLS mechanism is implemented as follows: 
 Handshake protocol is depicted in Figure 3. 
 In Figure 3, both client and server use 12 handshake messages to establish the 
encrypted channel prior to message exchanging. 
 Client sends ClientHello message proposing TLS options. 
 Server responds with ServerHello message selecting the TLS options. 
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 Server sends Certificate message, which contains the server's certificate. 
 Server requests client's certificate in CertificateRequest message, so that the 
connection can be mutually authenticated. 
 Server concludes its part of the negotiation with ServerHelloDone message. 
 Client responds with Certificate message, which contains the client's certificate. 
 Client sends session key information (encrypted with server's public key) 
in ClientKeyExchange message. 
 Client sends a CertificateVerify message to let the server know it owns the sent 
certificate. 
 Client sends ChangeCipherSpec message to activate the negotiated options for all 
future messages it will send. 
 Client sends Finished message to let the server check the newly activated options. 
 Server sends ChangeCipherSpec message to activate the negotiated options for all 
future messages it will send. 
 Server sends Finished message to let the client check the newly activated options. 
 After handshake operation two party share any data over TLS secure channel. (Two 
party starts to communicate over secure TLS channels after handshaking.) 
Application Note 1: Here TOE plays as client and DMC or remote Maintenance Agent as 
server. 
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Figure 3 Mutual TLS Authentication Handshake Protocol 
 
1.2.7.3 Sensors and RFID/ 2D Barcode devices to TOE Communication  
TOE gets input data from Input Devices (Sensors and RFID/ 2D Barcode) devices without any 
cryptographic operation. 
1.2.7.4 TOE Firmware Update  
Firmware update of the TOE shall be performed via Remote and Local Interface by 
Authenticated DMC or Authenticated Local Administrator or Authenticated Maintenance 
Agent. Firmware Update Public Key shall be loaded into TOE during manufacturing process. 
Firmware update control mechanisms are applied as follows: 
 Firmware Update Authority controls (tests) and signs the firmware with his Private 
Key. Firmware Update Authority ensures that the firmware version is upgraded. 
 TOE verifies the signature by using the Firmware Update Public Key. TOE updates the 
firmware if the signature verification holds and the version of the new firmware is 
greater than the current version. 
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2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS 
2.1 CC Conformance Claim 
This protection profile claims conformance to:  
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction 
and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September  2012 
[1] 
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security 
Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 
2012 [2] 
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security 
Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 
2012 [3] 
As follows 
 Part 2 extended due to the use of FCS_RNG.1, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2.  
 Part 3 conformant.  
The  
 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluatio n 
Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 [4] 
has to be taken into account. 
2.2 PP Claim 
This PP does not claim conformance to any protection profile.  
2.3 Package Claim 
The current PP is conformant to the following security requirements package:  
 Assurance package EAL2 conformant to CC, part 3. 
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale 
Since this PP does not claim conformance to any protection profile, this section is not 
applicable.  
2.5 Conformance Statement  
This PP requires demonstrable conformance of any ST or PP claiming conformance to this PP. 
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3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 External Entities and Roles 
The following external entities interact with TOE. Those roles have been defined for the use in 
this Protection Profile. It is possible that a party implements more than one role in practice. 
Table 1 Entities and Roles 
External Entity Role Description 
DMC Authenticated 
DMC 
Authenticated DMC is the remote center which takes 
water quality data, loads configuration parameters, 
updates firmware and controls Water Tracking System 
via Remote Interface.   
Local 
Administrator 
Authenticated 
Local 
Administrator 
Authenticated local administrator who can access User 
Data (see Table 2), configure parameters via its Local 
Interface.  
Initialization 
Agent 
Authenticated 
Initialization 
Agent 
Initialization Agent is the authority who authorized by 
People Health Agency and loads 
initialization/configuration parameters and keys to the 
TOE. 
Maintenance 
Agent 
Authenticated 
Maintenance 
Agent 
Maintenance Agent is the authority who authorized by 
People Health Agency and performs maintenance 
processes. Maintenance Agent can either connected to 
TOE via local interface (local Maintenance Agent) or 
via remote interface (remote Maintenance Agent). 
Firmware Update 
Authority 
- Firmware Update Authority is the agent who 
authorized by People Health Agency. This authority is 
responsible for testing the firmware and signing the 
verified firmware. 
DMC Controller - DMC Controller works for People Health Agency and 
performs random and periodic control on Water 
Tracking System and checks TOE’s functional and 
physical reliability. 
TOE Developer - TOE Developer is the entity who develops TOE 
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hardware and software. 
TOE 
Manufacturer 
- TOE Manufacturer is the entity who manufactures 
TOE. Usually, TOE Manufacturer might be the same 
as TOE developer. 
Water Producer 
Company 
- Water Producer Company (or Company) is the entity 
that produces water with carboy.  
Attacker - Attacker tries to manipulate the TOE in order to change 
its expected behavior and functionality. Attacker tries 
to breach confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
the Water Tracking System. 
 
3.1.2 Modes of TOE 
3.1.2.1 Initialization Mode 
Initialization mode is the mode which is used to load initialization parameters, especially TSF 
Data. The process is managed by authorized Initialization Agent. 
3.1.2.2 Operational Mode 
Operational mode is the normal-expected mode of TOE. TOE collects input data and sends 
output data. Input Data is the data collected from different Input Devices (such as Sensors and 
RFID/ 2D Barcode devices) over a period of time. Input Device ID is a unique number 
identifying the input device connected to the TOE. It includes the location information, type of 
process binding the source information to a specific address. 
TOE receives input data either from sensing modules and/or RFID/2D Barcode Reader. TOE 
verifies the received Input Data and prepares an Output Data such that  
Output = Input Data || time. 
TOE performs cryptographic operations on Output Data using TLS (or latest upgraded version) 
session keys and sends it either to DMC. 
An indicator is shown on TOE stating that TOE works in normal operational mode without any 
problems (e.g., green light etc.).  
3.2 Maintenance Mode 
TOE enters maintenance mode when one of the following conditions occurs; 
1. Opening and enforcement of electromechanical seal,  
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2. Mesh cover monitoring check failures (Mesh cover is an electromechanical structure 
that covers and  protects User Data  and TSF Data), 
3. Low battery detection below %10, 
4. Detection of environmental stress for five (5) times, 
5. Integrity check failures of User Data  and TSF Data for ten (10) successive times,  
6. Insufficient entropy during random number generation for ten (10) times, 
7. Failure detection by periodic self-test functions for five (5) times, 
8. Error detection during processing cryptographic operations for five (5) times, 
9. Unsuccessful software update detection for five (5) times, 
10. Detection of unsuccessful authentication attempt  via local interface for five (5) times, 
11. Detection of the fullness of system log memory. 
If TOE enters Maintenance Mode because of one of the first three conditions above, the 
following operations are done: 
 Cryptographic Keys (TLS session Keys) are deleted, 
 Input Data collection is stopped, 
 A High  Critical Security Log is generated, 
 An indicator is shown on TOE stating that TOE entered a high critical state (eg. A red 
lamb etc.).  
If TOE enters Maintenance Mode because of the other reasons, the following operations are 
done: 
 Operational Mode activities go on if possible, 
 A High  Critical Security Log is generated and sent to DMC automatically 
 An indicator is shown on TOE stating that TOE entered a medium critical state. 
3.2.1 Assets 
In the following tables, The User Data and the TSF Data on TOE are described. Additionally, 
their protection needs in terms of confidentially, integrity and authenticity are marked. Mark 
“X” and color “red” show that the asset needs protection. Color “orange” shows that, the 
protection need is less critical. 
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Table 2 TOE User Data and Protection Need 
Asset Description Need for 
Protection 
Conf.     Int.      
Auth. 
D
a
ta
 I
n
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
Input Data 
Collection 
Time 
It represents the exact date and time that an 
Input Data is received from an Input Device.  
This time is generated by TOE Clock. 
- X - 
Output Data Output data is the collection of Input Data 
that is packaged by TOE over a specific 
period of time. 
Output data includes Input Data received by 
input devices Input Data Collection Time 
and Input Device ID. 
X X X 
E
v
en
t 
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
Security Log Security Logs are produced when security 
problems are detected.  These logs are sent 
to DMC as soon as they are appeared and 
are available to local and remote users.  
 High critical security logs show that 
TOE has been attacked or there is a 
serious security problem.  
 Low critical security logs show that 
there might be an attack or there can 
be a security problem. 
These logs are kept with the log generation 
time. 
- X - 
System Log 
 
System Logs are kinds of Event Information 
which show TOE configuration and update 
operations. They are produced during any 
update and load operation.  
These logs are kept with the log generation 
time. 
- X - 
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Regular Log Regular logs are kinds of Event Information 
which show connection establish, event data 
read and output data generated. 
These logs are kept with the log generation 
time. 
   
F
a
b
ri
ca
ti
o
n
 P
a
ra
m
et
er
s 
Serial 
Number 
Serial Number is a unique ID of TOE that is 
given by Manufacturer. Different 
Manufacturers may give the same serial 
number to their product.  Therefore, Serial 
Number and Manufacturer Code are 
combined to form a unique Communication 
Module ID.  
- X - 
Manufacturer  
Code 
It is the unique code of TOE manufacturer. 
- X - 
 
Table 3 TOE TSF Data and Protection Need 
Asset Description Need for Protection 
Conf.     Int.       
Auth. 
Root Public 
Key 
Root Public Key is used to verify the 
certificates of DMC. It is loaded during 
manufacturing phase and cannot be 
updated. 
- X - 
TOE 
Certificate 
This certificate is owned by TOE that is 
used to establish a TLS channel between 
TOE and DMC.  It is loaded during 
manufacturing phase. 
- X X 
TOE Private 
Key 
This private key is owned by TOE that is 
used to establish a TLS channel between 
TOE and DMC. It is loaded during 
manufacturing phase. This key should be 
confidential and cannot be changed. 
X X - 
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Application Note 2: The expression "Device Information Data" might also be used when 
Threats and SFRs are being described. It includes any data that give information about TOE 
TLS session 
Keys 
They are generated during the 
establishment of TLS sessions and 
deleted when the session terminates. 
They are used for TLS encryption/ 
decryption and MAC computations.  
X X X 
TOE Access 
IP List 
It is a list of IP addresses which includes 
the DMC’s IP and/or other 
communication module(s) that the TOE 
can be communicate. An entity can 
communicate with TOE, if and only if it 
is configured according to those IP 
parameters. IP Access List is loaded in 
maintenance phase and can be updated 
via access control. 
- X X 
Firmware 
Update 
Public Key  
It is used to update TOE’s Firmware in a 
secure way. This key is loaded during 
manufacturing phase. New Firmware is 
signed using corresponding private key of 
Firmware Update Authority. 
- X X 
Firmware 
Version 
It is used during Firmware update 
procedure. An update is allowed if the 
new Firmware Version is greater than the 
current Firmware Version. 
- X - 
TOE Clock  It is clock of TOE. It is set during 
manufacturing phase and shall be updated 
during operational phase. 
- X X 
TOE 
Firmware  
It is firmware of TOE. It is loaded during 
manufacturing phase and shall be updated 
during Operational or Maintenance Phase 
via Remote or Local Access. 
- X X 
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and its configuration like Fabrication Parameters, DMC Parameters and Configurations, TOE 
Time and IP Access List. 
3.3 Threats 
Two kinds of attackers are considered when the threats are being identified. 
 Local Attacker: Attackers who have physical access to TOE. They might try to attack 
TOE by physical tampering. They can also abuse TOE’s Local Interface. 
 Remote Attacker: Attackers who are away from TOE. Remote Attackers try to 
conquer TOE by cyber-attacks and try to compromise the confidentiality, integrity and 
authenticity of data when transmitted between TOE-to-DMC or TOE-to-Maintenance 
Agent that are connected to TOE via remote interface.  They also try any attack 
concepts which does not need physical access to TOE: 
T.Transfer_Modification:  
A remote attacker may try to modify (i.e. alter, delete, insert, replay); Output Data, Event Log 
Data, TOE IP Access List, and TOE Firmware when transmitted between TOE-to-DMC or 
TOE-to-remote Maintenance Agent.  
Attacker may mislead DMC or Maintenance Agent by any modification. When trying to 
modify Output Data, attacker may compromise the genuine data to a fake data which creates 
false information. Attacker may also lead to malfunctions on TOE by modifying; firmware, IP 
Access List and Clock information during data transfer from DMC to TOE. Attacker may 
exploit misleading of DMC/remote Maintenance Agent and malfunction of TOE to get 
advantages for more specific attacks. 
T.Local_Modification:    
A local attacker may try to modify Data Information, Event Information, Fabrication 
Parameters and TSF Data via local interface of TOE. 
Attacker may mislead DMC and Local Administrator by any modification. When trying to 
modify any data mentioned above, attacker may compromise the genuine data to a fake data 
which creates false information. Attacker may also lead to malfunctions on TOE by modifying; 
TOE Firmware, DMC Parameters, Fabrication Parameters, IP Access List and Time. These 
malfunctions may be used to get advantages for more specific attacks. 
T.Transfer_Disclosure: 
A remote attacker may try to intercept the data transmitted between TOE-to-DMC or TOE-to-
remote Maintenance Agent. 
24 
 
When disclosing Output Data between TOE-to-DMC, attacker may try to violate the data 
privacy of the company. When disclosing the data between TOE-to-remote Maintenance Agent 
attacker can get some specific information about device functionality. 
T.Local_Disclosure: 
A Local Attacker may try to obtain:  
 Output Data 
 TOE Private Key, and TLS session Keys. 
When Output Data is disclosed, the attacker may try to violate the data privacy of the company.  
When TOE Private Key, and TLS session Keys are disclosed, the attacker can by-pass TOE 
security mechanism for more specific attacks. Also attacker can compromise the genuine data 
to a fake data which creates false information. 
T.Initialization: 
A local attacker may try to initialize TOE by using his/her own fake keys.  When the attacker 
initializes TOE, he/she may modify and disclose all user/TSF Data during TOE operation.   
T.Physical_Tamper: 
A local attacker may try to reach TOE internal processor and storage memory by physical 
tampering and manipulation.  When these components are reached, attacker may modify and 
disclose all user/TSF Data.  
T.Counterfeit_Data: 
A remote or local attacker may imitate TOE to respond DMC. Attacker may mislead DMC by 
sending fake Output Data. 
T.Skimming: 
A remote attacker may imitate DMC to get the Output Data from the TOE. When Output Data 
is disclosed, attacker may try to violate the privacy of the company. Attacker may modify 
Access IP List for more specific attacks. 
T.Update:  
A remote or local attacker may try to update TOE Firmware by using a malicious or old 
version to get advantages for more specific attacks. When the attacker updates TOE, he/she 
may modify and disclose all user/TSF Data.   
T.Non-Repudiation 
A remote or local authenticated user may try to deny his/her access and the operations 
performed on the TOE. 
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T.Battery_Disable: 
A remote or local attacker may use up internal battery by sending operation requests 
continuously. If TOE does not have internal battery, tamper detection mechanisms become out 
of order without line voltage. So, it cannot detect physical tampers. Attackers may chance to 
modify and disclosure all user/TSF Data by this way.  
T.Abuse_Function: 
An attacker may try to use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational 
phase in order to disclose or manipulate sensitive User Data or TSF Data,  manipulate the 
TOE's software or manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or 
functions of the TOE. 
T.Cyber_Attack:  
A remote attacker may try to modify Access Control and Authentication so it’s possible that 
the attacker increase his/her privileges. Event logs are also can be modified. Firewall settings 
could be changed as well. Attackers may try to modify, disclose  and unavailable all assets by 
this way. 
T.Residual_Data:  
There might be critical parameters in terms of confidentiality on TOE which became out of 
order. Attackers may perform attacks on User/TSF Data by using this information. 
3.4 OSPs 
OSP.PKI: 
The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that supply certificate and private key shall be trusted and 
operate properly.  
OSP.Sym_Key: 
It is ensured that the cryptographic keys are generated securely and the security of the keys is 
guaranteed in the life cycle. 
3.5 Assumptions 
This section describes assumptions that shall be satisfied by the TOE's operational 
environment. 
A.Trusted_Entities:  
It is assumed that authorized and authenticated external entities are trustworthy. They do not 
allow any damage to received data because of carelessness and abuse. 
A.Trusted_Admins:  
26 
 
It is assumed that the DMC Administrator, the Local Administrator and the Maintenance Agent 
are trustworthy and well-trained. 
During operation by using Local Interface, Local Administrator does not allow eavesdropping 
and modification between terminal and TOE local port. 
A. Authorized_Firmware:  
It is assumed that TOE firmware is controlled and certified by an authorized authority. 
A. Network:  
It is assumed that network connection with a sufficient reliability and bandwidth for the 
individual situation is available between TOE-and-DMC or TOE-and-remote Maintenance 
Agent. 
A. Control: 
It is assumed that DMC controllers perform periodic and random controls on TOE. They check 
TOE’s functional and physical reliability during controls.  
A.Trusted_Manufacturer: 
It is assumed that manufacturing is done by trusted manufacturers. 
A.Trusted_Designer: 
It is assumed that TOE is designed and implemented by trusted designers. They design and 
implement it maintaining IT security. 
A.Protected_Input_Device: 
It is assumed that TOE receives input data from input devices located in a physically protected 
environment which is defined in [6]. 
4 OBJECTIVES 
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE 
O.Access_Control: 
The TOE shall control restriction of access to functions and data.  
O.Event: 
TOE shall record important events about security problem and device configuration as listed in 
Table 6.  
O.Storage_Integrity: 
TOE shall provide integrity check of the data which is stored in the internal memory.   
O.Authentication: 
27 
 
TOE shall authenticate connected entities (users and systems). It shall provide authentication 
verification and MAC addition.  
O.Transfer: 
TOE shall provide encryption and integrity protection for transfer operation between TOE-to-
DMC or TOE-to-remote Maintenance Agent.  
O.Protect: 
TOE shall have self-test mechanism to control security functions in case of malfunction. TOE 
shall also delete information which is not necessary for future operations. 
O.Physical_Tamper 
TOE shall have mechanisms to resist and respond physical attacks. TOE should force attacker 
to leave evidence any physical attack attempt. 
O.Battery_Control 
TOE shall control battery level and respond under a definite level. TOE shall interpret as an 
attack and enter Maintenance mode under a more critical level.   
O.Abuse_Function: 
The TOE shall prevent the functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational 
phase.  
O.Update:  
TOE shall only accept controlled, authenticated and signed firmware by the authority. TOE 
shall control firmware version and accept only more recent version.  
O.Separate_IF:  
TOE shall have different physical interfaces for local and remote operations.  
O.Firewall: 
TOE accepts interaction only definite IP numbers which are appointed before. 
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment  
OE.Trusted_Entities:  
Authorized and authenticated external entities should be trustworthy. They do not let any 
damage to data that they receive because of carelessness and abuse. 
OE.Trusted_Admin:  
DMC Administrator and the Local Administrator shall be trustworthy and well- trained. Local 
Administrator must not let eavesdropping and modification action between terminal and TOE 
local port during operation by using Local Interface. 
OE.Upgrade_Software: 
TOE firmware shall be controlled and certified by an authorized entity. 
OE.Network: 
A network connection with a sufficient reliability and bandwidth shall be available between 
TOE-and-DMC or TOE-and-remote Maintenance Agent. 
OE.Keyman:  
Generation and transportation of cryptographic parameters shall be secure.   
OE.Development: 
Developers shall ensure that they design and implement TOE, maintain IT security during 
development. They also do not introduce any security hole intentionally. 
OE.Manufacturing: 
Manufacturer should ensure that TOE is manufactured maintaining IT security. They also do 
not introduce any security hole intentionally. 
OE.Control: 
DMC controllers should perform periodic and random controls on TOE. They check TOE’s 
functional and physical reliability during controls.  
OE.Physical_Security: 
The physical security of sensing modules and TOE shall be satisfied by the structure defined in 
[6].   
4.3 Security Objective Rationale 
Table 4 provides security problem definition covered by security objectives. Threats and OSPs 
are addressed by security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment. Assumptions 
are addressed by only security objectives for the operational environment.
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Table 4 Security Objective Rationale 
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T.Transfer_Modification     X                 
T.Local_Modification   
 
X X X X  X                
T. Transfer_Disclosure     X                 
T.Local_Disclosure 
 
X X  X                  
T.Initialization X   X             X     
T.Physical_Tamper  X     X               
T.Counterfeit_Data    X                  
T.Skimming X   X                  
T.Update  X X  X      X     X       
T.Battery_Disable  X      X              
T.Abuse_Function 
 
        X             
T.Cyber_Attack  X X  X       X X          
T.Residual_Data      X                
T.Non Repudation  X                    
O SP.PKI                 X     
O SP.Sym_Key                 X     
A.Trusted_Entities              X        X 
A.Trusted_Admins              X        
A.Authorized_Firmware               X       
A.Network                X      
A. Control                    X  
A.Trusted_Manufacturer                   X   
A.Trusted_Designer                  X    
A.Protected_Input_Device                     X 
 
Justification about Table 4 is given below;  
T.Transfer_Modification is addressed by O.Transfer to ensure integrity of communication 
channel.  
T.Local_Modification is addressed by O.Access_Control, O.Event, O.Storage_Integrity, 
O.Authentication and O.Protect.  
O.Access_Control ensures that only permitted systems has access to the functions and data. 
O.Event provides audit record for unsuccessful authentication attempt.  
O.Authentication ensures the authenticity of users.  
O.Storage_Integrity provides control operation for integrity of critical data.  
O.Protect defines that the TOE provides self-test mechanism to ensure the correct operation of 
critical function.  
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T.Transfer_Disclosure is addressed by O.Transfer to ensure the confidentiality of 
communication channel.  
T.Local_Disclosure is addressed by O.Access_Control, O.Event and O.Authentication.  
O.Access_Control ensures that only permitted users have access to the functions and data. 
O.Event provides audit record for unsuccessful authentication attempt.  
O.Authentication ensures the authenticity of users. 
T. Initialization is addressed by O.Access_Control O.Authentication and OE.KeyMan.  
O.Access_Control ensures that only permitted user may perform TOE Initialization,  
O.Authentication to ensure the origin of external entity.  
OE.KeyMan supports these objectives by the management of cryptographic parameters 
responsively outside of TOE.  
T.Physcal_Tamper is addressed by O.Physcal_Tamper to ensure that the TOE will provide 
mechanisms against an attacker to resist manipulation and modifications of the TOE by 
physical probing.  
O.Event contributes to this aspect as it provides the audit generation during a physical 
tampering.  
T.Counterfeit is addressed by O.Authentication to ensure the identity of TOE.  
T.Skimming is addressed by O.Access_Control and O.Authentication.  
O.Access_Control ensures that only permitted systems have access to the functions and data.  
O.Authentication ensures the origin of external entity.  
T.Update is addressed by O.Access_Control, O.Event, O.Authentication, O.Update and 
OE.Upgrade_Software.  
O.Access_Control ensures that only permitted user may perform firmware update. 
O.Event provides audit record for firmware update. 
O.Authentication and O.Update ensure the origin and integrity of firmware which will be 
loaded as a new version.  
OE.Upgrade_Software supports these objectives by the approval of updated firmware by a 
trusted authority . 
T.Battery_Disable is addressed by O.Battery_Control to ensure that the TOE will provide 
battery control mechanism.  
O.Event contributes to this aspect as it provides the audit generation about battery level.  
T.Abuse_Function is addressed by O.Abuse_Function to ensure not using test features of 
TOE during Initialization and Operational Phase.  
31 
 
T.Cyber_Attack is addressed by O.Access_Control, O.Authentication, O.Event, O.Firewall 
and O.Separate_IF.  
O.Access_Control ensures only permitted systems has access to the functions and data. 
O.Authentication ensures the origin of external entity.  
O.Event contributes to this aspect as it provides the audit generation for unsuccessful 
authentication attempt.  
O.Separate_IF provides different interfaces for local and remote connection and ensures the 
separation of critical data for different interface.  
O.Firewall provides protect against cyber attack. 
T.Residual_Data is addressed by O.Protect.  
It defines that the TOE provides self-test mechanism to ensure the correct operation of critical 
parameters. 
T.Non Repudation is adressed by O.Event. 
OSP.PKI and OSP.Sym_Key is directly and completely covered by the security objective 
OE.Keyman 
A.Trusted_Entities is directly and completely covered by the security objective 
OE.Trusted_Entities.  
A.Trusted_Admins is directly and completely covered by the security objective 
OE.Trusted_Admin.  
A.Authorized_Firmware is directly and completely covered by the security objective OE. 
OE.Development.Update 
A.Network is directly and completely covered by the security objective OE.Network.  
A. Control is directly and completely covered by the security objective OE.Control. 
A.Trusted_Manufacturer is directly and completely covered by the security objective 
OE.Manufacturing  
A.Trusted_Designer is directly and completely covered by the security objective  
A.Protected_Input_Device is directly and completely covered by the security objective 
OE.Physical Security. 
 
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION 
This Protection Profile uses components defined as extensions to CC Part 2 [CC2]. The 
components FCS_RNG, FMT_LIM are common in Protection Profiles for similar devices.
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5.1 Definition of the Family FCS_RNG 
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family 
(FCS_RNG) of the Class FCS (Cryptographic Support) is defined here. This extended family 
FCS_RNG describes an SFR for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. 
Family Behavior: 
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers, which are 
intended to be used for cryptographic purposes. 
Component Leveling: 
 
FCS_RNG.1 Generation of random numbers requires that the random number generator 
implements defined security capabilities and the random numbers meet a defined quality 
metric. 
Management 
FCS_RNG.1 There is no management activities foreseen. 
Audit 
FCS_RNG.1 There are no actions defined to be auditable. 
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation 
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:  -  
FCS_RNG.1.1   The TSF shall provide a [selection: physical, non-physical true,  
   deterministic, hybrid] random number generator, which implements: 
   [assignment: list of security capabilities]. 
 
FCS_RNG.1.2   The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [assignment: a  
   defined quality metric]. 
5.2 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM 
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family 
(FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes 
the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional 
requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of 
 FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers   1 
33 
 
functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no 
other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by 
limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability. 
Family Behavior: 
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a 
combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited 
capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner. 
Component Leveling:  
 
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities require that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities 
(perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose. 
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to 
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by 
disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life cycle. 
Management 
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 There are no management activities foreseen. 
Audit 
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 There are no actions defined to be auditable. 
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities 
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:  FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability 
FMT_LIM.1.1   The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so 
that    in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following 
   policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability 
policy]. 
 FMT_LIM Limited  Capabilities and Availability 
 2 
 1 
34 
 
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability 
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:  FMT_LIM.2 Limited capability 
FMT_LIM.2.1   The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability 
    so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” 
    the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability 
    and availability policy]. 
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6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS   
6.1 Overview   
This chapter describes the security functional and the assurance requirements which have to 
be fulfilled by the TOE. Those requirements comprise functional components from part 2 of 
[CC] and the assurance components as defined for the Evaluation Assurance Level 2 from 
part 3 of [CC]. 
The following notations are used:   
Refinement operation (denoted in such a way that added words are in bold text and changed 
words are crossed out): is used to add details to a requirement, and thus further restricts a 
requirement. 
Selection operation (denoted by italicized bold text and placed in square bracket): is used to 
select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement. 
Assignment operation (denoted by underlined text and placed in square bracket): is used to 
assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing 
the value in square brackets indicates assignment. 
Iteration operation are identified with a slash (e.g. “(/)”)  
It should be noted that the requirements in the following chapters are not necessarily be or 
dared alphabetically. Where useful the requirements have been grouped. 
The following table summarizes all TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) of this PP: 
Table 5 List of SFRs 
FAU: Security Audit 
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms for log 
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association 
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis  
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review 
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 
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FAU_STG.4/SEC_HIGH     Prevention of audit data loss - high critical security log 
FAU_STG.4/ SEC_LOW Prevention of audit data loss - low critical security log 
FAU_STG.4/REGULAR Prevention of audit data loss - regular log 
FAU_STG.4/SYS Prevention of audit data loss - system log 
FCS: Cryptographic Support 
FCO_NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin 
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC Cryptographic operation - Encryption/Decryption  
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH Cryptographic operation - Integrity/Authenticity 
FCS_COP.1/SIGN-VER   Cryptographic operation - signature verification 
FCS_COP.1/TLS  Cryptographic operation -TLS 
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES Cryptographic AES key generation for TLS 
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC Cryptographic HMAC key generation for TLS 
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation 
FDP: User Data Protection 
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control 
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control 
FDP_IFC.2 Complete information flow control 
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes 
FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data  without security attributes 
FDP_ITC.2 Import of User Data  with security attributes 
FDP_ETC.1 Export of User Data  without security attributes 
FDP_ETC.2 Export of  User Data  with security attributes 
FDP_RIP.1  Subset residual information protection 
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action 
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FDP_UIT.1  Data exchange integrity  
FDP_UCT.1  Basic data exchange confidentiality 
FIA: Identification and Authentication 
FIA_ATD.1  User attribute definition   
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling 
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action  
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms   
FIA_UAU.6  Re-authenticating   
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action 
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding   
FMT: Security Management 
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 
FMT_LIM.1  Limited Capabilities 
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability 
FMT_MTD.1/INI  Management of TSF Data  - Initialization Data 
FMT_MTD.1/TIME Management of TSF Data - Date  and Time 
FMT_MTD.1/IP_LIST Management of TSF Data  - IP Access List 
FMT_MTD.1/SECRET_READ Management of TSF Data  - Secret Read 
FMT_MTD.1/FIRMWARE  Management of TSF Data Secure Communication 
Module Firmware 
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes for Secure 
Communication Module Access Control  SFP 
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization for Secure 
Communication Module access SFP   
FPT: Protection of TSF 
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FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state 
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack 
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack 
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing 
FPT_RPL.1 Replay detection 
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps 
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF Data  consistency 
FTP: Trusted  Path/Channel 
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel for DMC 
 
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit 
Table 6 List of Logs 
Security Log Regular Log System Log 
High Critical Low Critical 
 Electro-mechanic seal is 
opened or forced 
 Mesh cover monitoring check 
failed 
 Battery level detected  less 
than %10  
 Environmental stress detected  
 Integrity check failures of 
User Data and TSF Data  
detected  
 Insufficient entropy during 
random number generation 
detected 
 Failure detected by periodic 
 Low battery 
level under 
%30 detected 
 DMC 
connection 
problem 
is detected 
 Absent of line 
voltage is 
detected 
 Low critical 
log memory 
fullness  
detected more 
than %60  
 Connection 
established via 
DMC 
 Connection 
established via 
Local 
Administrator 
(logs with ID of 
Local 
Administrator) 
 Connection 
established via 
Maintenance 
Agent (logs 
with ID of 
 Date/Time 
adjusted 
 DMC 
Configuration 
done 
 TOE 
Firmware 
updated 
successfully 
 IP Access List 
changed 
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Security Log Regular Log System Log 
High Critical Low Critical 
self-test function. 
 Errors detected during 
processing cryptographic 
operations, 
 Unsuccessful software update 
detected  
 Unsuccessful authentication 
attempt detected from local 
interface  
 System log memory fullness  
detected 
 
 
 
 Low critical 
log memory 
fullness  
detected more 
than %80  
 System log 
memory 
fullness  
detected more 
than %60  
 System log 
memory 
fullness  
detected more 
than %80  
 
Maintenance 
Agent) 
 Connection 
established via 
Initialization 
Agent (logs 
with ID of 
Initialization 
Agent) 
 Output Data 
has been 
generated 
 Event Data has 
been read 
 Save at least 100 logs. When 
the memory is full, Enter  
maintenance mode 
 Save at least 
50 logs 
 When the 
memory is 
full, override 
oldest data 
  Guarantee 
memory for 
all TOE life 
 When the 
memory is 
full enter 
Maintenance 
mode 
 
6.1.1.1 FAU_ARP Security Alarms  
FAU_ARP.1: Security Alarms for Log 
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:   FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis 
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FAU_ARP.1.1   The TSF shall take [enter TOE Maintenance mode (as detailed in 3.2 )] 
upon detection of a potential security violation. 
6.1.1.2 FAU_GEN Security audit data generation 
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:  FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps.  
FAU_GEN.1.1   The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the   
   following auditable events:  
    a)  Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;   
    b)  All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and   
    c) [the auditable events specified in Table 6]. 
FAU_GEN.1.2     The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following  
   information:  
    a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if  
    applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; 
   and  
    b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event  
    definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST,  
    [none]. 
FAU_GEN.2: User identity association 
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:   FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 
   FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification 
FAU_GEN.2.1   For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall 
   be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user 
   that caused the event. 
6.1.1.3 FAU_SAA Security audit analysis  
FAU_SAA.1: Potential violation analysis  
Hierarchical to:   - 
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Dependencies:   FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 
FAU_SAA.1.1 The TSF shall apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited  events 
   and based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the   
   enforcement of the SFRs. 
FAU_SAA.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited  
   events: 
    a) Accumulation or combination of [High Critical Security Log 
    listed in Table 6] known to indicate a potential security  
    violation; 
    b) [Low Critical Security Log listed in Table 6 shows that there 
    might be a security violation]. 
6.1.1.4 FAU_SAR Security audit review 
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review  
Hierarchical to:    - 
Dependencies:     FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation. 
FAU_SAR.1.1     The TSF shall provide [only Authenticated DMC operators and local 
   administrator] with the capability to read [all Event Log Data] from the 
   audit records.  
FAU_SAR.1.2     The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the 
   user to interpret the information. 
6.1.1.5 FAU_STG Security audit event storage 
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage  
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation  
FAU_STG.1.1     The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from 
   unauthenticated deletion.  
FAU_STG.1.2     The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthenticated   
   modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail. 
FAU_STG.4/SEC_HIGH    Prevention of audit data loss-High Critical Security Log 
Hierarchical to:     FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss  
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Dependencies:     FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage   
FAU_STG.4.1/SEC_HIGH     
The TSF shall [ignore audited events] and [enter TOE Maintenance 
mode (as detailed in 3.2 )] if the high critical security audit trail is full. 
FAU_STG.4/ SEC_LOW Prevention of audit data loss - Low Critical Security Log 
Hierarchical to:     FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss  
Dependencies:     FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage   
FAU_STG.4.1/ SEC_LOW      
   The TSF shall [overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and [none] 
   if the low critical security audit trail is full. 
Application Note 3: TOE shall keep at least 50 Low Critical Security Logs. 
FAU_STG.4/ REGULAR Prevention of audit data loss - Regular Log 
Hierarchical to:     FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss  
Dependencies:     FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage   
FAU_STG.4.1/ REGULAR      
   The TSF shall [overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and [none]  
   if the regular audit trail is full. 
Application Note 4: TOE shall keep at least 50 Regular Logs. 
FAU_STG.4/SYS Prevention of audit data loss - System Log 
Hierarchical to:     FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss  
Dependencies:     FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage   
FAU_STG.4.1/SYS   
The TSF shall [ignore audited events] and [enter TOE Maintenance 
mode (as detailed in 3.2 )] if the system audit trail is full. 
6.1.2 Class FCO Communication 
6.1.2.1 FCO_NRO Non-repudiation of origin 
FCO_NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin  
Hierarchical to:     FCO_NRO.1 Selective proof of origin  
Dependencies:     FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification  
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FCO_NRO.2.1     The TSF shall enforce the generation of evidence of origin for  
   transmitted [any data sent from TOE to DMC] at all times.  
FCO_NRO.2.2   The TSF shall be able to relate the [originator identity, time of origin] 
   of the originator of the information, and the [body of the message] of  
   the information to which the evidence applies.  
FCO_NRO.2.3     The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of 
   information to [recipient] given [immediately] 
6.1.3 Class FCS Cryptographic Support 
6.1.3.1 FCS_COP Cryptographic operation 
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC Cryptographic Encryption/Decryption Operation 
Hierarchical to:     -   
Dependencies:     [FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data without security attributes,  
   or FDP_ITC.2 Import of User Data  with security attributes,  
   or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
   FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction  
FCS_COP.1.1   The TSF shall perform [encryption, decryption] in  accordance with a 
   specified cryptographic algorithm [AES in CBC mode] and 
cryptographic key sizes [256 bit] that meet the following: [FIPS 197, NIST SP 800-38A].   
Application Note 5: This operation is used for TLS Enc/Dec. 
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH Cryptographic Integrity/Authenticity Operation 
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     [FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data without security attributes,  
   or FDP_ITC.2 Import of User Data  with security attributes,  
   or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
   FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction  
FCS_COP.1.1   The TSF shall perform [authentication, integrity protection] in  
   accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC] and 
   cryptographic key sizes [256 bit] that meet the following: [FIPS 198-1].   
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Application Note 6: This operation is used for HMAC generation/verification operations in 
TLS and Local Storage Integrity. 
FCS_COP.1/SIGN-VER Cryptographic Operation-Signature Verification 
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     [FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data without security attributes,  
   or FDP_ITC.2 Import of User Data  with security attributes,  
   or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
   FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction  
FCS_COP.1.1     The TSF shall perform [signature generation/verification] in accordance 
with a    specified cryptographic algorithm [RSA] and cryptographic key sizes 
   [2048] that meet the following:   [PKCS#1 v2.1].  
Application Note 7: This operation necessary only for TLS, Local Interface Access control 
and Firmware Update verification. 
FCS_COP.1/TLS Cryptographic operation for TLS  
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     [FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data without security attributes,  
   or FDP_ITC.2 Import of User Data  with security attributes,  
   or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
   FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction  
FCS_COP.1.1     The TSF shall perform [TLS authentication, encryption, decryption] in  
   accordance with a specified  cryptographic algorithm [assignment: 
   cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 
   cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following:   [assignment: list of  
   standards].  
Application Note 8: The TOE shall only use cryptographic specifications and algorithms 
(CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 or 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) as described in Section 1.2.7.2 (see [5]). 
6.1.3.2 FCS_CKM Cryptographic Key Management 
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES Cryptographic AES key generation for TLS 
Hierarchical to:     -  
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Dependencies:     [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or  
   FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]  
   FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction  
FCS_CKM.1.1     The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a  
   specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [TLS v1.2 DHE_RSA 
or ECDHE_ECDSA] and  specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bit] that meet the 
following: [RFC 5246, RFC 4492].  
 
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC Cryptographic HMAC key generation for TLS 
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or  
   FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]  
   FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction  
FCS_CKM.1.1     The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a 
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [TLS v1.2 DHE_RSA 
or ECDHE_ECDSA] and  specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bit] 
that meet the following: [RFC 5246, RFC 4492]. 
FCS_CKM .4 Cryptographic Key Destruction 
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     [FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data without security  
   attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of User Data  with security  
   attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS_CKM.4.1     The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a  
   specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment:  
   cryptographic key destruction method] that meets the following:  
   [none]. 
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Application Note 9: Key destruction process is applied for TLS Enc/Dec and HMAC session 
keys. 
6.1.3.3 FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers 
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation 
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     - 
FCS_RNG.1.1   The TSF shall provide a [selection: physical, non-physical true,  
   deterministic, hybrid] random number generator, which implements: 
   [assignment: list of security capabilities]. 
 
FCS_RNG.1.2   The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [assignment: a  
   defined quality metric]. 
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection 
6.1.4.1 FDP_ACC Access control policy 
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control  
Hierarchical to:   -  
Dependencies:   FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control  
FDP_ACC.1.1   The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Communication Module Access 
Control  SFP] on  [ 
   Subjects:  
 Authenticated DMC  
 Authenticated Local Administrator 
 Authenticated Initialization Agent 
 Authenticated Maintenance Agent 
 
   Objects:  
 User data stored in Secure Communication Module 
o Data Information 
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 Output Data 
o Event Information 
o Fabrication Parameters 
 TSF Data 
o Root Public Key 
o TOE Certificate 
o TOE Private Key 
o TLS session Keys 
o TOE Access IP List  
o Firmware Update Public Key  
o Firmware Version 
o TOE Clock  
o TOE Firmware 
 Operations: write, read, modify] 
6.1.4.2 FDP_ACF Access control functions 
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control  
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control  
   FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization  
FDP_ACF.1.1     The TSF shall enforce [Secure Communication Module Access Control  
SFP] to objects    based on following :[ 
   Subjects:  
 Authenticated Initialization Agent 
 Authenticated DMC  
 Authenticated Local Administrator 
 Authenticated Maintenance Agent 
    Subject Attributes:  
 User Identity,  
 Authentication Status,  
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 TOE Interface, 
 IP Access List,  
   Objects:  
 User data stored in Secure Communication Module 
o Data Information 
 Output Data 
o Event Information 
o Fabrication Parameters 
 TSF Data (as detailed in FDP_ACC.1.1) 
   Object Attributes:  
 Access Control List,  
 Object ID,  
 Input Data Collection Time, 
 Command freshness, 
 Firmware signature (for Secure Communication Module 
Firmware update),  
 Firmware version (for Secure Communication Module 
Firmware update), 
 Message Authentication Code   
] 
FDP_ACF.1.2     The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation 
   among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [ 
 an Authenticated Initialization Agent is only allowed to write 
initialization/configuration parameters via Local Interface. 
 an Authenticated DMC is allowed to read access User Data 
(Output Data, Event Information, Fabrication Parameters), to 
read/write IP Access List, to set TOE Clock via Remote 
Interface. Also TOE Firmware can be updated via Remote 
Interface. DMC’s IP is specifically defined in TOE Access IP 
List.  
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 an Authenticated Local Administrator is allowed read User Data 
(Data Information, Event Information and Fabrication 
Parameters), read/write/modify IP Access List, set TOE Clock 
and perform Firmware Update via Local Interface. 
 Authenticated Maintenance Agent is allowed to  read User Data 
(Data Information, Event Information and Fabrication 
Parameters), via Local Interface after TOE enters into 
Maintenance Mode. Also Authenticated Maintenance Agent is 
allowed to read/write/modify Input Device ID, IP Access List, 
set TOE Clock and performs Firmware Update via Local or 
Remote Interfaces. 
 TOE accepts write and modification operation for  TOE Clock 
and IP Access List via Remote Interface only if { 
o sender: an Authenticated DMC or Maintenance Agent 
and has an IP from IP Access List 
o Command freshness=successful (not replayed) 
o MAC control: successful 
} 
 TOE accepts Secure Communication Module Firmware update 
operation via Remote Interface only if { 
o Sender: an Authenticated DMC or Maintenance Agent 
has an IP from IP Access List 
o Command freshness=successful (not replayed) 
o MAC control: successful 
o Firmware signature control: successful 
o Firmware version: recent} 
].  
FDP_ACF.1.3      The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects 
    based on the following additional rules: [none].  
FDP_ACF.1.4      The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based 
    on the following additional rules: [ 
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 nobody shall be allowed to modify or  delete  
o Output Data 
o Event Information 
o Fabrication Parameters 
o TSF Data excluding TOE Clock, IP Access List and 
TOE Firmware. 
 nobody shall be allowed to have read access TSF Data except 
TOE Clock and IP Access List, Firmware Version].  
6.1.4.3 FDP_IFC Information flow control policy 
FDP_IFC.2  Complete information flow control  
Hierarchical to:     FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control 
Dependencies:     FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes  
FDP_IFC.2.1     The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Communication Module Information 
Flow Control SFP] on [TOE, Sensing Modules, RFID/ 2D Barcode 
Readers, DMC, Local User and all information flowing between them] 
and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from 
subjects covered by the SFP.  
FDP_IFC.2.2     The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in 
   the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an 
   information flow control SFP.  
 
6.1.4.4 FDP_IFF Information flow control functions 
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes  
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control  
   FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization  
FDP_IFF.1.1   The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Communication Module Information 
Flow Control SFP]  based on the following types of subject and 
information security  attributes: [ 
   subjects: The TOE and external entities on DMC or local side   
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   information: any information that is sent to, from or via the TOE  
security attributes:  destination interface, source interface, destination 
authentication status (Initialization Agent authentication status, 
Maintenance Agent authentication status), command freshness, 
connection interval (against data traffic analysis)].   
FDP_IFF.1.2     The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject  
   and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following 
   rules hold: [ 
 DMC connection establishment is allowed, if  
o source interface=TOE/DMC and destination 
interface=DMC/TOE 
o  secure communication with TLS-CA and MAC 
Authentication=true,  
o command freshness=successful, 
o connection interval=acceptable  
 Local Interface connection establishment is allowed, if source 
interface=TOE/local port and destination interface=local 
port/TOE and local authentication=true 
 Initialization Agent connection establishment is allowed, if 
o Initialization Agent authentication status=OK 
 Local Administrator connection establishment is allowed, if 
o Local Administrator authentication status=OK 
 Maintenance Agent (local) connection establishment is allowed, 
if 
o Maintenance Agent authentication status=OK  
 Maintenance Agent (remote) connection establishment is 
allowed, if 
o source interface = TOE/Maintenance_Agent and 
destination interface= Maintenance_Agent /TOE 
o  secure communication with TLS-CA and MAC 
Authentication=true,  
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o command freshness=successful, 
o connection interval=acceptable  
o Maintenance Agent authentication status=OK  
 The data received from Sensing Modules, RFID/ 2D Barcode 
Readers is excepted 
FDP_IFF .1.3   The TSF shall enforce the [none]. 
FDP_IFF .1.4    The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the 
   following rules: [none]. 
FDP_IFF .1.5    The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the  
   following rules: [none]. 
6.1.4.5 FDP_ITC Import from the outside of the TOE 
FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data without security attributes  
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
   FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
   FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization  
FDP_ITC.1.1     The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Communication Module Access 
Control  SFP and  Secure Communication Module Information Flow 
Control SFP] when importing User Data, controlled under the SFP, 
from outside of the   TOE.  
FDP_ITC.1.2     The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user  
   data when imported from outside the TOE.  
FDP_ITC.1.3     The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing User Data  
   controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: [none].  
Application Note 10: FDP_ITC.1 is applicable for import of: TOE Access IP List, Secure 
Communication Module Time via Local Interface. 
FDP_ITC.2: Import of User Data with security attributes 
Hierarchical to:  - 
Dependencies:  [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or 
   FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] 
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   [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or 
   FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] 
   FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF Data consistency 
FDP_ITC.2.1     The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Communication Module Access 
Control  SFP and Secure Communication Module Information Flow 
Control SFP] when importing User Data, controlled under the SFP, 
from outside of the TOE. 
FDP_ITC.2.2     The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported
   User Data. 
FDP_ITC.2.3     The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the  
   unambiguous association between the security attributes and the  
   User Data received. 
FDP_ITC.2.4     The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the 
   imported User Data is as intended by the source of the User Data. 
FDP_ITC.2.5     The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing User Data  
   controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: [ 
 upgrade of TOE Firmware components only if the integrity and 
the authenticity of the upgrade firmware package is confirmed, 
signature of authority verified and version approved by TOE 
 upgrade of the DMC Parameters only if the integrity and the 
authenticity of the upgrade package is confirmed by virtue of  
the upgrade credentials 
 upgrade of the Secure Communication Module Time and IP 
Access List only if the integrity and the authenticity of the 
upgrade package is confirmed by TOE 
   ]. 
6.1.4.6 FDP_ETC Export from the TOE 
FDP_ETC.1 Export of User Data without security attributes 
Hierarchical to:  - 
Dependencies:  [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or 
   FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] 
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FDP_ETC.1.1     The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Communication Module Access 
Control SFP and Secure Communication Module Information Flow 
Control SFP] when exporting User Data, controlled under the SFP(s), 
outside of the TOE. 
FDP_ETC.1.2     The TSF shall export the User Data without the User Data's associated 
   security attributes 
Application Note 11: FDP_ETC.1 is applicable for export of data via Local Interface after 
authentication is successful. 
FDP_ETC.2 Export of User Data with security attributes  
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
   FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FDP_ETC.2.1     The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Communication Module Access 
Control SFP and Secure Communication Module Information Flow 
Control SFP] when exporting User Data, controlled under   the SFP(s), 
outside of the TOE.  
FDP_ETC.2.2     The TSF shall export the User Data with the User Data’s associated 
    security attributes.  
FDP_ETC.2.3     The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside 
   the TOE, are unambiguously associated with the exported User Data.  
FDP_ETC.2.4     The TSF shall enforce the following rules when User Data is exported 
   from the TOE: [ 
 TOE adds Message Authentication Code (HMAC) and 
command time for any data before sending to DMC or remote 
Maintenance Agent.] 
Application Note 12: FDP_ETC.2 is applicable for export of data from Remote Interface. 
While communicating with DMC or remote Maintenance Agent, TLS connection is 
established that includes HMAC and encryption. 
6.1.4.7 FDP_RIP Residual information protection 
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection  
Hierarchical to:     -  
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Dependencies:    -  
FDP_RIP.1.1     The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a  
   resource is made unavailable upon the [deallocation of the resource 
   from] the following objects: [session keys generated during TLS Server 
   Authentication]. 
6.1.4.8 FDP_SDI Stored data integrity 
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action  
Hierarchical to:     FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring  
Dependencies:     -  
FDP_SDI.2.1   The TSF shall monitor User Data stored in containers controlled by the 
   TSF for [integrity errors] on all objects, based on the following  
   attributes: [assignment: User Data attributes].  
FDP_SDI.2.2   Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [generate an audit 
   event. If this occurs ten times successively, enter TOE Maintenance 
   mode, generate an audit, inform Authenticated DMC (as detailed in 
   3.2 ) and show a warning indicator on display]. 
6.1.4.9 FDP_UIT Inter-TSF User Data Integrity Transfer Protection  
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity  
Hierarchical to:  - 
Dependencies:  [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
   FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
   [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or  
   FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]  
FDP_UIT.1.1  The TSF shall enforce [Secure Communication Module Control  SFP] 
to [transmit, receive] User Data   any transmitted and received data 
between TOE and DMC in a manner protected from [modification, 
deletion, insertion, replay errors]. 
FDP_UIT.1.2   The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of User Data any  
   received data from DMC, whether [modification, deletion, insertion, 
   replay] has occurred. 
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6.1.4.10FDP_UCT Inter-TSF User Data Confidentiality Transfer Protection  
FDP_UCT.1: Basic data exchange confidentiality 
 
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:   [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or  
   FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]  
   [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
   FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Communication Module Access 
Control  SFP] to [transmit, receive] User Data  any transmitted and 
received data between TOE and DMC in a manner protected from 
unauthenticated  disclosure. 
6.1.5 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication   
6.1.5.1 FIA_ATD User Attribute Definition   
FIA_ATD.1: User attribute definition   
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:   - 
FIA_ATD.1.1   The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes  
   belonging to individual users: [  
 User Identity 
 Status of Identity (Authenticated or not) 
 Role Attributes 
o Initialization Agent 
o Maintenance Agent 
  [assignment: list of security attributes ]. 
6.1.5.2 FIA_AFL Authentication failures 
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling  
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication   
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FIA_AFL.1.1     The TSF shall detect when [five (5)] unsuccessful authentication  
   attempts occur related to [authentication attempts at Local Interface].  
FIA_AFL.1.2     When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts have 
   been [met], the TSF shall [enter TOE Maintenance mode, generate an 
   audit, inform Authenticated DMC (as detailed in 3.2 ) and show a 
  warning indicator on the display]. 
Application Note 13: Only applicable for Local Interface authentication 
6.1.5.3 FIA_UAU User authentication 
FIA_UAU.2: User authentication before any action   
Hierarchical to:   FIA_UAU.1  Timing of authentication 
Dependencies:   FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification 
FIA_UAU.2.1   The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before 
   allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. 
FIA_UAU.5: Multiple authentication mechanisms   
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:   - 
FIA_UAU.5.1   The TSF shall provide [ 
 TLS authentication via certificates at the Remote Interface 
 HMAC authentication via Symmetric keys at the Remote 
Interface 
 Password-Token authentication at the Local Interface 
   ] to support user authentication. 
FIA_UAU.5.2   The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [ 
 DMC shall be authenticated via TLS-certificates and MAC 
Authentication at the Remote Interface. Remote Maintenance 
Agent shall be authenticated via token-password and shall be 
authenticated via TLS-certificates and MAC Authentication. 
 Local Administrator, Initialization Agent and local 
Maintenance Agent shall be authenticated via token-password 
at the Local Interface.  
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   ]. 
FIA_UAU.6: Re-authenticating   
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:   - 
FIA_UAU.6.1   The TSF shall re-authenticate an external entity under the conditions [ 
 TLS channel to the WAN shall be disconnected after 24 hours, 
 Password-token authentication shall be re-authenticated after 10 
minutes of inactivity for local users 
 HMAC and decryption authentication shall be repeated for any 
command  
   ]. 
6.1.5.4 FIA_UID User Identification 
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action  
Hierarchical to:     FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification  
Dependencies:     -  
FIA_UID.2.1     The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before 
   allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. 
6.1.5.5 User-subject binding (FIA_USB)   
FIA_USB.1: User-subject binding   
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:   FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition 
FIA_USB.1.1   The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with 
   subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [attributes as defined in  
   FIA_ATD.1]. 
FIA_USB.1.2   The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of 
   user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: 
   [none]. 
FIA_USB.1.3   The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user 
   security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: 
   [none]. 
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6.1.6 Class FMT: Security Management 
6.1.6.1 FMT_SMF Specification of Management Functions  
FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions   
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:   - 
FMT_SMF.1.1   The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management 
   functions: [ 
 Initialization 
 Date Time Configuration 
 Secure Communication Module Firmware Update 
 IP List Update 
   ]. 
6.1.6.2 FMT_SMR Security management roles  
FMT_SMR.1: Security roles   
Hierarchical to:  - 
Dependencies:   FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification 
FMT_SMR.1.1   The TSF shall maintain the roles [ 
 Authenticated Initialization Agent 
 Authenticated Local Administrator 
 Authenticated Maintenance Agent 
 Authenticated DMC  
FMT_SMR.1.2   The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. 
6.1.6.3 FMT_LIM Limited Capabilities and Availability  
FMT_LIM.1 Limited Capabilities 
Hierarchical to:  -. 
Dependencies:  FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability 
FMT_LIM.1.1  The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so 
   that in  conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the 
   following policy is enforced: [ 
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   Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery do not allow: 
 User Data to be manipulated and disclosed, 
 TSF Data  to be manipulated or disclosed, 
 Embedded software to be reconstructed, 
 substantial information about construction of TSF to be 
gathered which may enable other attacks  
   ] 
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability 
Hierarchical to:  - 
Dependencies:  FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities 
FMT_LIM.2.1  The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so 
   that in  conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the 
   following policy is enforced:[ 
   Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery do not allow, 
 User Data to be manipulated and disclosed, 
 TSF Data  to be manipulated or disclosed, 
 Embedded software to be reconstructed, 
 substantial information about construction of TSF to be 
gathered which may enable other attacks  
   ] 
6.1.6.4 FMT_MTD Management of TSF Data  
FMT_MTD.1/INI Management of TSF Data - Initialization Data 
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     FMT_SMR.1 Security roles  
   FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions  
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI   The TSF shall restrict the ability to [write] the [initialization data] to 
   [Authenticated Initialization Agent, Authenticated Maintenance Agent].   
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Application Note 14:  Initialization data includes: TOE configuration parameters, TOE clock, 
ToE IP list. 
FMT_MTD.1/TIME Management of TSF Data - Date and Time 
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     FMT_SMR.1 Security roles  
   FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions  
 
FMT_MTD.1.1/TIME    
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify] the [TOE Clock]  
 to [Authenticated DMC, Authenticated Local Administrator, 
Authenticated Maintenance Agent and Authenticated Initialization Agent]. 
FMT_MTD.1/IP_LIST Management of TSF Data - IP Access List 
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     FMT_SMR.1 Security roles  
   FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions  
FMT_MTD.1.1/IP_LIST   
   The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify] the [IP Access List] to 
   [Authenticated DMC and Authenticated Initialization Agent].   
FMT_MTD.1/SECRET_READ Management of TSF Data - Secret Read 
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     FMT_SMR.1 Security roles  
   FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions  
FMT_MTD.1.1/SECRET_READ    
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [read] the [TSF Data  except Secure 
Communication Module time and IP Access List] to [none ].   
FMT_MTD.1/FIRMWARE Management of TSF Data – Secure Communication Module 
Firmware 
Hierarchical to:     -  
Dependencies:     FMT_SMR.1 Security roles  
   FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions  
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FMT_MTD.1.1/FIRMWARE    
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify] the [Secure 
Communication Module Firmware] to [Authenticated remote 
Maintenance Agent and Authenticated DMC].   
 
6.1.6.5 FMT_MSA Management of security attributes  
FMT_MSA.1: Management of security attributes for Secure Communication Module 
Access Control SFP 
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:   [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or 
   FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] 
   FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 
   FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 
FMT_MSA.1.1   The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Communication Module Access 
Control SFP] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [IP 
Access List] to [Authenticated DMC and Authenticated Initialization 
Agent and Authenticated Maintenance Agent]. 
FMT_MSA.3: Static attribute initialization for Secure Communication Module access 
SFP   
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:   FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 
   FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 
FMT_MSA.3.1   The TSF shall enforce the [Secure Communication Module Access 
Control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default values for security 
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. 
FMT_MSA.3.2   The TSF shall allow the [none] to specify alternative initial values to 
   override the default values when an object or information is created. 
6.1.7 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF 
6.1.7.1 FPT_FLS Fail Secure  
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state 
Hierarchical to:  - 
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Dependencies:  - 
FPT_FLS.1.1   The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of 
   failures occur: [ 
 detection of physical manipulation to electro-mechanic seal 
 detection of physical attack to mesh covers 
 detection of environmental stress five (5) times 
 detection of integrity check failures of User Data  and TSF Data 
five (5) times 
 detection of integrity check failures of User Data  and TSF Data 
for ten (10) successive times,  
 detection of insufficient entropy during random number 
generation ten (10) times 
 detection of failures of periodic self- test functions for five (5) 
times, 
 detection of low battery level under %10,  
 detection of unsuccessful software update five (5) times, 
 detection of unsuccessful authentication attempt  from local 
interface five (5) times,  
 detection of lack of system log memory, 
 [assignment   : list of other types of failures in the TSF, or  none   
]   . 
Application Note 15: The above defined secure state is the Maintenance Mode (See Section 
3.2). 
 
6.1.7.2 FPT_PHP TSF Physical Protection  
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack  
Hierarchical to:     FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack  
Dependencies:    FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior  
FPT_PHP.2.1     The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering 
   that might compromise the TSF.  
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FPT_PHP.2.2     The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical 
   tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.  
FPT_PHP.2.3     For [ 
 the Secure Communication Module, 
 User Data and TSF Data storage memory in Secure 
Communication Module], the TSF shall monitor the devices 
and elements and notify [any user by generating audit and 
showing a warning on display] when physical tampering with 
the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred. 
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack 
Hierarchical to:  - 
Dependencies:  - 
FPT_PHP.3.1  The TSF shall resist [ 
 physical attack to electro-mechanic seal 
 physical attack to mesh covers 
 environmental stress 
   ] to the [ 
 Secure Communication Module, 
 User Data and TSF Data storage memory in Secure 
Communication Module 
   ] by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.  
6.1.7.3 FPT_TST TSF Self-Test  
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing 
Hierarchical to:  - 
Dependencies:  - 
FPT_TST.1.1   The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests [selection: 
during initial start-up,periodically during normal operation, at the 
request of the authorised user, at the conditions[assignment: conditions 
under which self-test should occur]] to demonstrate the integrity of 
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TSF Data including stored  executable code and correct operation of 
[the TSF].   
FPT_TST.1.2   The TSF shall provide authenticated users with the capability to verify 
   the integrity of [TSF Data].   
FPT_TST.1.3   The TSF shall provide authenticated users with the capability to verify 
   the integrity of [TSF]. 
6.1.7.4 FPT_RPL Replay Detection  
FPT_RPL.1: Replay detection   
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:   - 
 
FPT_RPL.1.1   The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: [authenticated 
   DMC, Sensors and RFID/ 2D Barcode devices]. 
FPT_RPL.1.2   The TSF shall perform [ignore replayed data] when replay is detected. 
Application Note 16: Replay attack protection is provided by TLS and time control as 
defined in Section 1.2.7.2. 
6.1.7.5 FPT_STM Time Stamps  
FPT_STM.1: Reliable time stamps   
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:   - 
FPT_STM.1.1   The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps. 
Application Note 17: Reliable time stamp provide by authenticated users and authenticated 
DMC. 
6.1.7.6 FPT_TDC Inter-TSF TSF Data consistency 
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF Data consistency 
Hierarchical to:  - 
Dependencies:  - 
FPT_TDC.1.1  The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [TLS 
   client / server authentication parameters] when shared between the TSF  
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and another trusted IT product authenticated DMC. 
FPT_TDC.1.2  The TSF shall use [TLS client / server authentication] when interpreting  
the TSF Data from another trusted IT product authenticated DMC. 
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels   
6.1.8.1 FTP_ITC Inter -TSF trusted channel  
FTP_ITC.1: Inter -TSF trusted channel for DMC   
Hierarchical to:   - 
Dependencies:   - 
FTP_ITC.1.1   The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and 
   another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other  
   communication channels and provides assured identification of its end 
   points and protection  of the channel data from modification or  
   disclosure. 
FTP_ITC.1.2    The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the 
   trusted channel. 
FTP_ITC.1.3   The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for  
   [Authenticated DMC]. 
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE 
The assurance requirements for the evaluation of the TOE and for its development and 
operating environment are chosen as the predefined assurance package EAL2.   
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale 
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale 
Table 7 provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage and also giving 
an evidence for sufficiency and necessity of the SFRs chosen. 
Table 7 Coverage of Security Objectives by SFRs for TOE 
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FAU_ARP.1  X           
FAU_GEN.1  X      X     
FAU_GEN.2  X           
FAU_SAA.1  X           
FAU_SAR.1  X           
FAU_STG.1  X X          
FAU_STG.4/SEC
_HIGH     
 X X          
FAU_STG.4/ 
SEC_LOW 
 X X          
FAU_STG.4/ 
REGULAR 
 X X          
FAU_STG.4/SYS  X X          
FCO_NRO.2    X         
FCS_COP.1/ENC-
DEC  
   X X     X   
FCS_COP.1/INT-
AUTH  
   X X     X   
FCS_COP.1/SIGN
-VER  
         X   
FCS_COP.1/TLS     X X     X   
FCS_CKM.1/TLS
_AES 
    X        
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FCS_CKM.1/TLS
_HMAC 
    X        
FCS_CKM.4     X        
FCS_RNG.1 X   X X        
FDP_ACC.1 X            
FDP_ACF.1 X          X X 
FDP_IFC.2 X           X 
FDP_IFF.1 X          X X 
FDP_ITC.1 X    X       X 
FDP_ITC.2 X    X     X   
FDP_ETC.1 X           X 
FDP_ETC.2 X    X        
FDP_RIP.1       X      X 
FDP_SDI.2   X          
FDP_UIT.1      X     X   
FDP_UCT.1      X     X   
FIA_ATD.1     X         
FIA_AFL.1 X            
FIA_UAU.2 X   X         
FIA_UAU.5 X   X         
FIA_UAU.6  X   X         
FIA_UID.2 X   X         
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FIA_USB.1    X         
FMT_SMF.1          X   
FMT_SMR.1 X            
FMT_LIM.1  X        X    
FMT_LIM.2 X        X    
FMT_MTD.1/INI  X            
FMT_MTD.1/TI
ME 
X            
FMT_MTD.1/IP_
LIST 
X            
FMT_MTD.1/SE
CRET_READ 
X            
FMT_MTD.1/FIR
MWARE 
X         X   
FMT_MSA.1 X            
FMT_MSA.3 X            
FPT_FLS.1   X    X X     
FPT_PHP.2  X     X      
FPT_PHP.3       X      
FPT_TST.1   X   X       
FPT_RPL.1     X        
FPT_STM.1  X X          
FPT_TDC.1    X X     X   
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FTP_ITC.1     X     X   
 
A detailed justification of required for suitability of the security functional requirements to 
achieve the security objectives is given in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 Suitability of the SFRs 
Security Objective Security Functional Requirement 
 
O.Access_Control FCS_RNG.1 Provides random number for 
Local Access control mechanism 
FDP_ACC.1 Provides security functional 
policy for data access 
FDP_ACF.1 Defines security attributes and 
rules for access control policy 
FDP_IFC.2 Provides security functional 
policy for information flow 
FDP_IFF.1 Defines subjects, attributes and 
information within the scope of 
information flow control policy. 
Provides information flow control 
policy and deny access rules.  
FDP_ITC.1 Provides import of Firmware 
Update Public Key, Local Access 
Control Public Key, Encryption 
Key, HMAC Key, DMC 
Parameters, Secure 
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Communication Module Time and 
IP Access List from outside of the 
TOE with the role of authenticated 
Local Administrator using Access 
Control SFP and Information 
Flow Control SFP.  
FDP_ITC.2 Provides import of DMC 
Parameters, IP Access List, 
Secure Communication Module 
Time, Secure Communication 
Module Firmware from outside of 
the TOE with the role of 
Authenticated DMC using Access 
Control SFP and Information 
Flow Control SFP. 
FDP_ETC.1 Provides export of Data 
Information, Event Information 
and Device Information to outside 
of the TOE with the role of 
authenticated Maintenance Agent 
using Access Control SFP and 
Information Flow Control SFP.  
FDP_ETC.2 Provides export of Data 
Information, Event Information 
and Device Information to outside 
of the TOE with the role of 
Authenticated DMC using Access 
Control SFP and Information 
Flow Control SFP. 
FIA_AFL.1 Detects and records authentication 
failure events for Authenticated 
DMC and authenticated Local 
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Administrator 
FIA_UAU.2 No allowed actions before 
authentication 
FIA_UAU.5 Defines multiple authentication 
mechanisms for remote access and 
local access. 
FIA_UAU.6 Defines re-authentication 
mechanisms for remote access and 
local access. 
FIA_UID.2 No allowed actions before 
identification 
FMT_SMR.1 Defines roles used in Security 
functional policies  
FMT_LIM.1 Provide deploying test features for 
limiting capabilities for disclosure 
and modification of User Data and 
TSF Data. 
FMT_LIM.2 Provide deploying test features for 
limiting availabilities for 
disclosure and modification of 
User Data and TSF Data. 
FMT_MTD.1/INI Define initialization data 
management rule 
FMT_MTD.1/TIME Define current date and time 
management rule 
FMT_MTD.1/IP_LIST Define IP Access List 
management rule 
FMT_MTD.1/SEDRET_READ Define reading TSF Data  except 
Secure Communication Module 
time and IP Access List 
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management rule 
FMT_MTD.1/FIRMWARE Define Secure Communication 
Module Firmware management 
rule 
FMT_MSA.1 Provides the functions to restrict 
the  
ability to modify the security 
attributes to nobody 
FMT_MSA.3 
 
 
 
 
Provides the functions to provide 
restrictive default values for 
security attributes that are used to 
enforce the SFP and allows 
nobody to specify alternative 
initial values to override the 
default values when an object or 
information is created. 
O.Event FAU_ARP.1 Define actions maintained during 
detection of a potential security 
violation. 
FAU_GEN.1 Generates correct audit events 
FAU_GEN.2 Generates audit events with the 
identity of the user that caused the 
event 
FAU_SAA.1 Defines violation analysis for logs 
FAU_SAR.1 Allows Authenticated DMC and 
local administrator to read audit 
records 
FAU_STG.1 Protects stored audit data from 
unauthorized deletion 
FAU_STG.4/SEC_HIGH Define actions carried out during 
74 
 
audit trail is full 
FAU_STG.4/ SEC_LOW Define actions carried out during 
audit trail is full 
FAU_STG.4/ REGULAR Define actions carried out during r 
audit trail is full 
FAU_STG.4/SYS Define actions carried out during 
audit trail is full 
FPT_PHP.2 Generation of audit event 
detection of physical tampering 
FPT_STM.1 Provides accurate time for logging 
events 
O.Storage_Integrity FAU_STG.1 Protects stored audit data integrity 
from unauthorized modification 
FAU_STG.4/SEC_HIGH Define actions carried out during 
audit trail is full 
FAU_STG.4/ SEC_LOW Defines actions carried out during 
audit trail is full 
FAU_STG.4/ REGULAR Define actions carried out during 
audit trail is full 
FAU_STG.4/SYS Defines actions carried out during 
audit trail is full 
FDP_SDI.2 Monitors User Data   stored for 
integrity errors  
FPT_FLS.1 Defines failure conditions 
including integrity failures for 
preservation of secure state 
FPT_TST.1 Detects integrity failures for TSF 
Data  including stored executable 
code 
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FPT_STM.1 Provides accurate time for 
integrity check  
O.Authentication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FCO_NRO.2 
 
Generates evidence of origin of 
the data to be transferred to the 
DMC 
FCS_COP.1/INT_AUTH Provides origin authentication and  
verification for any data that is 
sent or taken by the TOE 
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC Provides authentication 
mechanism by decryption 
operation during Secure 
Communication Module 
Initialization. 
FCS_COP.1/TLS Provides authentication 
mechanism between TOE-DMC 
and TOE-remote Maintenance 
Agent 
FCS_RNG.1 Provides random number for TLS 
mechanism 
FIA_ATD.1 Defines subject attributes   
FIA_UAU.2 No allowed actions before 
authentication 
FIA_UAU.5 Defines multiple authentication 
mechanisms for remote access and 
local access. 
FIA_UAU.6 Defines re-authentication 
mechanisms for remote access and 
local access. 
FIA_UID.2 No allowed actions before 
identification 
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FIA_USB.1 Defines user - subject binding 
mechanism for the TOE 
FPT_TDC.1 Provides the capability to 
consistently interpret TSF Data  
(Certificate and session key) 
O.Transfer FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC  Provides the encryption and 
decryption operations for secure 
communication between DMC-
TOE and TOE-remote 
Maintenance Agent 
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH Provides the integrity protection 
operations for secure 
communication between DMC-
TOE and TOE-remote 
Maintenance Agent 
FCS_COP.1/TLS  Provides the encryption and 
decryption operations for secure 
communication between DMC- 
TOE and DMC-TOE and TOE-
remote Maintenance Agent 
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES Generates session keys for 
communication between DMC-
TOE and TOE-remote 
Maintenance Agent 
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC Generates HMAC keys for 
communication between DMC-
TOE and TOE-remote 
Maintenance Agent 
FCS_CKM.4 Destroys cryptographic keys in 
the TOE 
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FCS_RNG.1 Provides random number for TLS 
mechanism 
FDP_ITC.1 Provides import of Firmware 
Update Public Key, Local Access 
Control Public Key, Encryption 
Key, HMAC Key, DMC 
Parameters, Secure 
Communication Module Time and 
IP Access List from outside of the 
TOE with the role of authenticated 
Local Administrator using Access 
Control SFP  and Information 
Flow Control SFP.  
FDP_ITC.2 Provides import of DMC 
Parameters, IP Access List, 
Secure Communication Module 
Time, Secure Communication 
Module Firmware from outside of 
the TOE with the role of 
Authenticated DMC using Access 
Control SFP  and Information 
Flow Control SFP 
FDP_ETC.2 Provides export of Data 
Information, Event Information, , 
IP Access List, DMC Parameters  
and Secure Communication 
Module time to outside of the 
TOE with the role of  
Authenticated DMC using Access 
Control SFP  and Information 
Flow Control SFP 
FDP_UIT.1 Protect received and transmitted 
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data from unauthenticated 
modification 
FDP_UCT.1 Protect received and transmitted 
data from unauthenticated 
disclosure  
FPT_RPL.1 Protect received data from replay 
attack 
FPT_TDC.1 Provides interpretation of private 
key and session key during 
communication with DMC 
FTP_ITC.1 Provide a secure communication 
channel to the DMC and remote 
Maintenance Agent 
O.Protect FDP_RIP.1 Defines protection of residual 
information 
FPT_TST.1 Provide self-test mechanism to 
demonstrate TSF Data  integrity 
O.Physical_Tamper FPT_FLS.1 Defines failure conditions 
including physical tamper for 
preservation of secure state 
FPT_PHP.2 Provide notification of physical 
tampering 
FPT_PHP.3 Define resistive mechanism of the 
TOE to the physical tampering 
O.Battery_Control FAU_GEN.1 Generate audit event for low 
battery level under %10 
FPT_FLS.1 Defines failure conditions 
including detection of low battery 
level for preservation of secure 
state 
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O.Abuse_Function FMT_LIM.1 Provide deploying test features for 
limiting capabilities for disclosure 
and modification of User Data and 
TSF Data. 
FMT_LIM.2 Provide deploying test features for 
limiting availabilities for 
disclosure and modification of 
User Data and TSF Data . 
O.Update FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC  Provides the encryption and 
decryption operations for secure 
communication between DMC 
and Secure Communication 
Module during Secure 
Communication Module 
Firmware update 
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH Provides the integrity protection 
operations for secure 
communication between DMC-
TOE and TOE-remote 
Maintenance Agent during Secure 
Communication Module 
Firmware update 
FCS_COP.1/SIGN-VER Provides verification of Secure 
Communication Module 
Firmware signature before 
upgrade the working one.  
FCS_COP.1/TLS  Provides the encryption and 
decryption operations for secure 
communication between DMC-
TOE and TOE-remote 
Maintenance Agent 
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FDP_ITC.2 Provides import of TOE Firmware 
from outside of the TOE. 
FDP_UIT.1 Protect received and transmitted 
data from unauthenticated 
modification 
FDP_UCT.1 Protect received and transmitted 
data from unauthenticated 
disclosure  
FMT_SMF.1 Provide management functions 
including firmware update 
FMT_MTD.1/FIRMWARE Define Secure Communication 
Module Firmware management 
rule 
FPT_TDC.1 Provides interpretation session 
key during communication with 
DMC and remote Maintenance 
Agent 
FTP_ITC.1 Provides a secure communication 
channel to the DMC or remote 
Maintenance Agent 
O.Separate_IF FDP_ACF.1 Interfaces of the Secure 
Communication Module used in 
access control SPF are clear  
FDP_IFF.1 Interfaces of the TOE used in 
information flow control SPF are 
clear 
O.Firewall FDP_ACC.1 Define access conditions policy of 
the TOE 
FDP_ACF.1 Define access condition rules for 
the TOE 
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FDP_IFC.2 Define information flow control 
policy of the TOE 
FDP_IFF.1 Define information flow control 
rules for the TOE 
FDP_ITC.2 Provides importation rules of 
DMC Parameters, IP Access List, 
Secure Communication Module 
Time, Secure Communication 
Module Firmware from outside of 
the TOE with security attribute 
FDP_ETC.2 Provides exportation rules of Data 
Information, Event Information 
and Device Information to outside 
of the TOE with security attribute 
 
6.3.2 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements dependencies 
Selected security functional requirements include related dependencies. Table 9 below 
provides a summary of the security functional requirements dependency analysis.  
Table 9 Security Functional Requirements Dependencies 
Component Dependencies Included / not included 
FAU_ARP.1 FAU_SAA.1 included 
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 included 
FAU_GEN.2 
FAU_GEN.1 
FIA_UID.1 
included 
FAU_SAA.1 FAU_GEN.1 included 
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 included 
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 included 
FAU_STG.4/SEC_HIGH FAU_STG.1 included 
FAU_STG.4/ SEC_LOW FAU_STG.1 included 
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Component Dependencies Included / not included 
FAU_STG.4/REGULAR FAU_STG.1 included 
FAU_STG.4/SYS FAU_STG.1 included 
FCO_NRO.2 FIA_UID.1 
FIA.UID.2 is hierarchical 
to FIA.UID.1 
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC 
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 
or FCS_CKM.1 ; 
FCS_CKM.4 
FDP_ITC.1 included. 
According to 
communication protocol 
encryption key should not 
be deleted. Tamper system 
of the TOE protects keys 
from misuse, disclosure or 
modification.   
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH 
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 
or FCS_CKM.1 ; 
FCS_CKM.4 
FDP_ITC.1 included. 
According to 
communication protocol 
MAC key should not be 
deleted. Tamper system of 
the TOE protects keys from 
misuse, disclosure or 
modification.   
FCS_COP.1/SIGN-VER 
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 
or FCS_CKM.1 ; 
FCS_CKM.4 
FDP_ITC.1 included. 
According to 
communication protocol 
Firmware Update Public 
Key should not be deleted. 
Tamper system of the TOE 
protects keys from misuse, 
disclosure or modification.   
FCS_COP.1/TLS 
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 
or FCS_CKM.1 ; 
FCS_CKM.1 and  
FCS_CKM.4 included 
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Component Dependencies Included / not included 
FCS_CKM.4 
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES 
FCS_CKM.2 or 
FCS_COP.1 ; FCS_CKM.4 
FCS_COP.1 and 
FCS_CKM.4 included 
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC 
FCS_CKM.2 or 
FCS_COP.1 ; FCS_CKM.4 
FCS_COP.1 and 
FCS_CKM.4 included 
FCS_CKM.4 
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 
or FCS_CKM.1 
FDP_ITC.1 and 
FCS_CKM.1  included 
FCS_RNG.1 No dependencies - 
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 included 
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1; FMT_MSA.3 included 
FDP_IFC.2 FDP_IFF.1 included 
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1; FMT_MSA.3 
FDP_IFC.2 is hierarchical 
to FDP_IFC.1; 
FMT_MSA.3 included 
included 
FDP_ITC.1 
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 
; FMT_MSA.3 
included 
FDP_ITC.2 
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 
;  
FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1; 
FPT_TDC.1 
included 
FDP_ETC.1 FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 included 
FDP_ETC.2 FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 included 
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies - 
FDP_SDI.2 No dependencies - 
FDP_UIT.1 
FDP_ACC.1 or 
FDP_IFC.1; FTP_ITC.1 or 
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_IFC.1, 
FTP_ITC.1 included 
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Component Dependencies Included / not included 
FTP_TRP.1 
FDP_UCT.1 
FDP_ACC.1 or 
FDP_IFC.1; FTP_ITC.1 or 
FTP_TRP.1 
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_IFC.1, 
FTP_ITC.1 included 
FIA_ATD.1 No dependencies - 
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 
FIA.UAU.2 is hierarchical 
to FIA.UAU.1 
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 
FIA.UID.2 is hierarchical 
to FIA.UID.1 
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies - 
FIA_UAU.6 No dependencies - 
FIA.UID.2 No dependencies - 
FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 included 
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies - 
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 
FIA.UID.2 is hierarchical 
to FIA.UID.1 
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 included 
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 included 
FMT_MTD.1/INI FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1 included 
FMT_MTD.1/TIME FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1 included 
FMT_MTD.1/IP_LIST FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1 included 
FMT_MTD.1/SECRET_READ FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1 included 
FMT_MTD.1/FIRMWARE FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1 included 
FMT_MSA.1 
FDP_ACC.1 or 
FDP_IFC.1; FMT_SMR.1; 
FMT_SMF.1 
included 
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Component Dependencies Included / not included 
FMT_MSA.3 
FMT_MSA.1; 
FMT_SMR.1 
included 
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies - 
FPT_PHP.2 FMT_MOF.1 
Management functions 
having been defined during 
the manufacturing and 
fixed over the whole life 
time of the TOE. No 
management of these 
functions is necessary here 
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies - 
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies - 
FPT_RPL.1 No dependencies - 
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies - 
FPT_TDC.1 No dependencies - 
FTP_ITC.1 No dependencies - 
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale 
The current assurance package was chosen based on the pre-defined assurance packet EAL2. 
EAL2 is chosen because the threats that were chosen are consistent with an attacker of basic 
attack potential. 
6.3.4 Security Requirements - Internal Consistency 
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security 
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the 
security assurance requirements (SARs) together forms an internally consistent whole.   
The dependency analysis in Table 9 shows that the basis for internal consistency between all 
defined functional requirements is satisfied.  
The assurance package EAL2 is a pre-defined set of internally consistent assurance 
requirements. The assurance requirements are internally consistent as all (additional) 
dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.   
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Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise, if there are 
functional-assurance dependencies being not met. So, there are no inconsistencies between the 
goals of these two groups of security requirements.    
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7 ACRONYMS 
 
AES : Advanced Encryption Standard 
CC : Common Criteria 
CCMB : Common Criteria Management Board 
DMC : Data Management Center 
DSL : Digital Subscriber Line 
EAL : Evaluation Assurance Level (defined in CC) 
EDC : Electricity Distribution Company 
GPRS : General Packet Radio Service 
GPS : Global Positioning System 
OSP : Organizational Security Policy 
PP : Protection Profile 
PKI : Public Key Infrastructure 
PLC : Power Line Communication 
SFR : Security Functional Requirements 
SHA : Secure Hash Algorithm 
TLS - CA : Transport Layer Security - Client Authentication 
TOE : Target of Evaluation 
TSF : TOE Security Functionality (defined in CC) 
TSE 
WTS 
: Turkish Standards Institute 
: Water Tracking System 
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